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The  WA  Supreme  Court  (in  August  2009)
1  ruling  on 
whether  Brightwater,  the  organisation  caring  for 
quadriplegic  Christian  Rossiter,  could  accede  to  Mr 
Rossiter’s  wish  to  refuse  nutrition  will  no  doubt  be 
considered a landmark. That it may be, but we should not 
see it as a landmark decision that decides on a question of 
euthanasia  or  a  so-called  right  to  die.  The  decision 
upholds  the  general  (and  generally  accepted)  principle 
that a person with the (legal) capacity to make a decision 
can decide not to have a medical procedure. In this case 
the medical procedure is one that allows Mr Rossiter to 
be fed via a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) 
tube. 
 
Martin CJ emphasised in his judgement that this  
“is not about euthanasia. Nor is it about physicians 
providing lethal treatments to patient who wish to 
die. Nor is it about the right to life or even the right 
to death. Nor is the court asked to determine which 
course of action is in the best interests of a medical 
patient.  The  only  issue  which  arises  for 
determination  in  this  case  concerns  the  legal 
obligations  under  Western  Australian  law  of  a 
medical  service  provider  which  has  assumed 
responsibility for the care of a mentally-competent 
patient what that patient clearly and unequivocally 
stipulates  that  he  does  not  wish  to  continue  to 
receive medical services which, if discontinued, will 
inevitably lead to his death.”
2 
The decision, however, has a two effects – affirming the 
legal  principle;  and  allowing  a  person  to  choose  to  die 
while in care that in normal circumstances would keep the 
person alive. 
 
                                                 
1 Supreme Court of Western Australia, in the matter of Brightwater Care 
Group  v  Rossiter,  CIV  2406  of  2009,  and  the  case  of  Rossiter  v 
Brightwater  Care  Group,  CIV  2436  of  2009. 
http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/publications/pdf/DraftJudgment.p
df 
2http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/publications/pdf/DraftJudgment.
pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Already a number of concepts have been introduced that 
would benefit from clarification, if not close discussion. But 
before I go on I would like to apologise to Mr Rossiter for 
using his name and situation so as to make a general case 
about obligations. A part of his personal story is in the public 
domain and I might therefore claim a right of sorts to use it, 
but I have not spoken with him and he has not consented to 
the use I propose to make of his story. I have, however, sent 
him a draft of this paper. In focusing on issues Mr Rossiter’s 
case raises there will almost certainly be no benefit to Mr 
Rossiter  himself,  but  I  hope  that  I  can  contribute,  even 
minimally, to a better understanding of some of the issues 
involved.  
 
Despite  the  inevitability  of  Mr  Rossiter’s  death  should  he 
refuse the treatment that will feed him, in legal terms the 
WA Supreme Court’s decision is not about a supposed right 
to die. However most of the public will likely interpret the 
decision  in  this  light.  And  in  doing  so  they  may  focus  on 
rights  to  the  exclusion  of  obligations,  which  would  be  a 
grave  mistake.  Members  of  a  society  accept  that  each 
member has some rights and some duties. These rights and 
duties or obligations generally occur together, but how this 
happens is not a simple matter. When rights and obligations 
do occur together, one does not cause the other; the one is 
the necessary flip side of the other and there is a reciprocal 
relationship  between  them.  But  rights  and  duties  (or 
obligations) are reciprocal in two senses
3.  
 
Firstly, each adult member of a society has both rights and 
duties. She or he gets the benefits of having the rights, but 
also has the burden of associated duties. If the duties are 
not  fulfilled  then  certain  rights  may  be  removed.  Take 
killing, for example. In the normal course of my living in a 
society I have a duty not to kill another human. If I do so and 
am found guilty at law (e.g. of unlawful killing) then I am 
likely to have my right to freedom removed and I will be put 
in  jail.  This,  in  broad  terms,  is  the  situation  which 
Brightwater sought to clarify with its Supreme Court case so 
that the organization, and the nurses caring for Mr Rossiter, 
could not be considered to have killed him. This also raises 
the thorny moral question of whether there is a difference 
between killing a person and letting a person die, but I don’t 
propose to pursue that line further here. 
 
Secondly,  each  adult  member  of  society  is  connected  to 
every other member of the society through a network of 
rights and duties. Each member of a society has a right that 
other members fulfil their duties. Each member has a duty 
                                                 
3 Duties and obligations are not identical, but for the purposes here they 
will be conflated. I hope that in doing so there is greater clarity about the 
issues here rather than a degree of obfuscation. 
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to  each  other  member,  and  each  other  member  has  a 
right that that duty be fulfilled. Now that Mr Rossiter’s 
right  to  refuse  a  medical  treatment  has  been  affirmed, 
there is a corresponding obligation on his carers to attend 
to this right when he chooses to assert it. 
 
These two senses of the reciprocity involved in rights and 
obligations might sound complex, but they are part of the 
normal  contractual  arrangements  for  members  of  a 
society.  
 
However, if we focus on someone’s claimed right to the 
exclusion of our duties or obligations – of whatever sort – 
we are always, in a sense, reacting. In cricketing terms, we 
go on the back foot, on the defensive. If, on the other 
hand we focus on our obligations we move into a more 
proactive regime in which we as moral operators take the 
lead. This is not to say that in accepting my obligations I 
do not expect some rights in return, but it is to say that by 
starting with obligations we enter a different dynamic. 
 
Rights and obligations are complex in themselves and also 
share a complex relationship. The following points are far 
from  an  exhaustive  coverage  but  they  may  give  some 
sense of the complexity of rights:  
 
Rights 
Rights are a contentious areas of both philosophy and the 
law.  
 
A  right  is,  roughly,  an  entitlement  that  constrains 
behaviour. That is, my right constrains others’ behaviour 
toward me. If I have a right (or entitlement) to X then you 
have a corresponding obligation to behave toward me in a 
certain  way.  You  have  a  choice  whether  to  meet  the 
obligation  or  not.  As  we  have  just  seen,  rights  and 
obligations are in a sense pair-bonded and in practice we 
generally  can’t  separate  them,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
clarification, it will pay to deal with rights by themselves.  
 
•  Normative  force.  Rights  have  normative  force  in 
that they guide us in how to behave, how to value 
certain things, and how to determine good actions 
from bad and right actions from wrong.  
•  Inalienable.  Moral  rights  are  generally  thought  to 
be  inalienable:  that  is,  they  cannot  be  traded  or 
given away. If I waive my right I am not saying I do 
not have the right, merely that I will not exercise it. 
•  A  claim  to  have  a  right  can  conflict  with  other 
claims to having a right. E.g. A miner’s claimed right 
to extract minerals may conflict with an indigenous 
group’s  claimed  cultural  rights  to  protect  ancient 
rock art.  Rights are putative until they are resolved 
or  settled.  Once  they  are  settled  and  agreed  on, 
conflicts are resolved. However, in practice, if rights 
are  the  only  item  in  your  ethics  toolkit  you  will 
always be dealing with conflict. 
•  Moral v. legal rights. The paradigms of moral rights 
and legal rights are not aligned e.g. I may have legal 
rights that infringe or otherwise impact on others’ 
moral rights and vice versa. Also, types of rights may 
be incommensurable so that getting legal redress for 
infringement  of  some  moral  rights  may  not  be 
possible and the allocation of some legal rights to one 
group may infringe the moral rights of another. The 
legal rights of miners in come to mind here: their right 
to  mine,  granted  by  a  court,  can  override  claimed 
rights of landowners.  
•  Rights may be implied or stated. Some rights may be 
presumed as a consequence of belonging to a group 
or they may be granted explicitly (such as legal rights). 
Some rights are commonly considered natural rights: 
we have them simply because we are human. But the 
area  of  natural  rights  is  itself  contentious,  with 
philosophers divided on whether there are such things 
as  natural  rights.  Those  who  argue  against  natural 
rights will often claim that morality has no need of the 
hypothesis that there are such rights. 
•  Absolute  rights.  There  are  also  claims  that  certain 
rights are absolute. A right to life is a prime example. 
But an absolute right to life may conflict with another 
right that may be claimed to be absolute: the right to 
use all necessary means to defend one’s own life.  
•  Rights involve reciprocal relationships. As discussed 
earlier,  there  are  two  main  senses  in  which  the 
reciprocal  relationship  operates.  There  are  also  two 
main schools of thought on the relationship between 
rights and obligations:  
o  my  right  exists  because  you  have  an 
obligation  (which  is  called  the  control 
theory);  
o  or  your  obligation  exists  because  of  my 
right (the interests theory). 
•  Rights may be active or passive.  
o  An active right takes the form: ‘A’ has the 
right  to  Θ  (where  Θ  is  an  active  verb). 
Someone with this type of right can freely 
choose to perform certain actions.  E.g. A 
football  coach  (A)  has  an  active  right  to 
move (Θ) players to and from his bench.  
o  A passive right takes the form: ‘A’ has the 
right that PΘ. A person with a passive right 
should be free from having certain actions 
done to them. E.g. a University academic 
(A) has a passive right that the University 
(P)  not  fire  (Θ)  her  for  publishing 
unpopular views. 
•  Rights may be negative or positive. That is, there is 
the (negative) right to be left alone  and the (positive) 
right  to  get  help  when  you  need  it.  These  are 
sometimes classified as 
o  liberty  rights  (which  are  negative  rights) 
and  
o  welfare rights (which are positive).  
If  I  have  a  liberty  right  to  eat  ice  cream,  the 
obligation on others is to leave me alone to get on 
with it. If I have a welfare right to breathe, say, the 
obligation on others is to help me to breathe. 
•  Rights have complex structures. Following the work 
of Hohfeld (1919) they can be seen to comprise four 
‘incidents’: the privilege, the claim, the power and the 
immunity.   Australasian Medical Journal 2009, 1, 8, 65-69 
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o  I have a privilege to do ‘x’ if I have no duty to 
[do]  ‘x’.  I  might,  for  example,  exercise  the 
privilege to attend my local primary school to 
assist  with  children’s  reading  even  though  I 
don’t have children attending the school. 
o  I have a claim that P does ‘q’ if and only if P 
has a duty to me to do ‘q’. I have entered into 
a  contractual  arrangement  to  work  for  a 
university.  The  university  has  a  duty  to  pay 
me  for my  work and I have a claim on the 
university in this regard. 
o  I have a power if and only if I have the ability 
to change my or another’s ‘incidents’. I have a 
limited  power  to  change  the  contractual 
arrangement  between  myself  and  the 
university:  in  effect,  I  can  terminate  the 
contract – subject to certain conditions. 
o  I have immunity if and only if P does not have 
the  ability  to  alter  my  ‘incidents’.  I  have  a 
limited immunity against certain actions by the 
university in regard to the contract. 
•  It is also important to note that one may have a 
right  to  do  wrong.  The  right  to  academic  free 
speech, for example, is a right to do (some form of) 
wrong.  I  have  the  right  to  speak  even  if  some  of 
what I say has the capacity to cause harm.  
 
Whatever we may think about the rights of people such as 
Mr Rossiter, his request actually goes to the heart of the 
question  of  what  our  obligations  are  to  people  in  our 
community and is an issue that cannot be fully addressed 
in legal terms. An obligation is something that binds us to 
behave in some way (it shares a common root with the 
word ‘ligature’). Being bound does not, however, imply 
lack of choice.  
 
We  have  obligations  to  others  –  and  possibly  to 
ourselves
4.  We  are  bound,  that  is  we  are  under  some 
moral or legal pressure, to act in certain ways to certain 
things or groups of things.  The things to  which we  are 
bound to act in certain ways includes but is not limited to, 
people. For example, we are bound to act in certain ways 
toward  animals  such  as  pets  and  public  goods  such  as 
street signs and clean air.  
 
One approach to obligation is based on the value – this 
may be seen in terms of intrinsic value – that people have 
in and of themselves. In this view, our obligation to other 
people comes from the  value that they have  in and of 
themselves.  That  is,  people  have  a  non-instrumental 
value, a value that is beyond that which they may have for 
any particular purpose. In fact to use a person merely for 
some  instrumental  purpose  is  to  disrespect  their  very 
humanity. This is part of a Kantian moral approach that I 
won’t go further with here.  
 
Another  approach  which  recognises  value  in  humans  is 
one  in  which  we  come  under  an  obligation  simply  in 
coming face to face with a person. The primary obligation 
                                                 
4 The notion of obligations to self is, however, contentious 
at the point when we face someone, is to ask: how can I 
help you? If we disregard genuine answers to that question 
and  continue  to  give  only  what  we  want  to  or  are 
comfortable with we move into a paternalistic charity, avoid 
the  tough  decisions  and  fail  to  value  fully  life  in  all  its 
complexity.  Of  course  we  should  not  merely  accede  to 
someone’s wish otherwise we may end up helping someone 
commit a wrong, such as would happen if someone asked 
for help in a robbery. That is, our obligation is still to ask: 
how can I help you? But we do need to make wise decisions 
on what to do. 
 
In medical ethics the major operating principles are respect 
for  autonomy,  not  causing  harm,  attempting  to  bring  a 
benefit and justice. If we are truly to respect the autonomy 
(literally  self-governance  or  self-determination)  of  people 
such as Mr Rossiter we will attend very carefully to their 
honest,  and  rationally-considered  wishes.  We  might  well 
readily accede to someone’s claim right to be left alone, but 
Mr  Rossiter  wants  not  merely  to  be  left  alone,  he  wants 
some assistance such as pain relief so that should he choose 
to refuse food he can be free enough of pain and aware 
enough of his surroundings to do such things as watch and 
enjoy  television  for  as  long  as  he  can.
5  This  assistance  is 
crucially  important  as  it  necessarily  involves  others  and 
places a burden on them. Here we should note, also, that 
the assistance is required not only of Brightwater, the legal 
entity charged with his care, but of individual professionals 
on  a  daily,  if  not  hourly,  basis.  This  presents  an  extra 
dimension  to  the  problem  because  the  principles 
underpinning medical ethics – which grew out of research 
ethics – do not transfer directly or unproblematically to the 
professions. That is part of an argument made elsewhere
6 
and not to be pursued here, except to note that the ethics 
of the relationship between professional carer and patient 
are  not  straightforward.  The  professional  relationship 
between carer and cared-for is not fully explained by the 
standard principles of medical ethics. For a start, the focus 
                                                 
5 Martin CJ noted in his judgement on the two cases brought that there was 
a subsidiary question that focused on the legality of Mr Rossiter’s doctors 
prescribing analgesics “for the purposes of sedation and pain relief as he 
approaches death” and that this “subsidiary issue seems… to raise more 
complex questions than the primary questions…” The decisions in the case 
turned on sections of the Western Australian Criminal Code, particularly 
Sections  262  and  259.  On  the  subsidiary  issue  Martin  CJ  found  “Dr 
Benstead's  rights  and  obligations  or  the  right  of  any  other  medical 
practitioner treating Mr Rossiter with respect to the provision of palliative 
care  if  and  when  Mr  Rossiter  directs  Brightwater  to  discontinue  the 
provision  of  nutrition  and  hydration  are  no  different  to  the  obligations 
which attend the treatment of any other patient who may be approaching 
death. Even more specifically, in my view there is no reason why section 
259(1) would not apply to the provision of palliative care to Mr Rossiter 
even though the occasion for the provision of that palliative care might 
come  about  as  a  consequence  of  Mr  Rossiter's  informed  decision  to 
discontinue the treatment necessary to sustain his life. … “It seems to me, 
therefore, that I should not grant any specific declaratory relief in relation 
to those issues other than to declare that any person providing palliative 
care to Mr Rossiter on the terms specified in subsection (1) of section 259 
would not be criminally responsible for providing that care notwithstanding 
that  the  occasion  for  its  provision  arises  from  Mr  Rossiter's  informed 
decision to discontinue the treatment necessary to sustain his life.”  
6  Millett,  S  and  Tapper,  A.  (2009).  “Autonomy  and  trust  in  professional 
ethics”.  Submitted  to  Australasian  Journal  of  Professional  and  Applied 
Ethics, August.  Australasian Medical Journal 2009, 1, 8, 65-69 
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on justice conflicts with care, as shown by the differences 
between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. 
 
People such as Mr Rossiter wish to limit their suffering. 
They  may  do  so  with  good  palliative  care,  but  this  is 
unlikely to address all aspects of their suffering. Suffering 
itself is another complex issue and one that is very hard to 
pin down with any precision. For example: 
•  Can suffering be explained in terms of “pain”? 
No,  pain  has  a  location  whereas  suffering 
doesn’t. 
•  Can  we  differentiate  between  degrees  of 
suffering? 
•  Are  there  qualitative  differences  between 
experiences of suffering?  
And so on. 
 
Suffering  may  include  an  element  of  hopelessness  or 
despair  and  as  I  discuss  shortly,  hope  may  have  an 
important role to play in limiting suffering.  
 
If we are honest with ourselves we will understand that 
extending  life  for  its  own  sake  may  be  also  to  extend 
suffering  and  may  cause  avoidable  harms.  Despite 
support for such a position in some religions, choosing a 
life  of  great  suffering  over  a  pain-free  death  does  not 
seem, to a great many people, to be a rational choice. It 
may be a choice that a person of faith can make, and faith 
itself can play a part in reducing suffering. But what of 
those for whom faith is not in the picture at all or is not 
adequate?  A  faith-based  position  may  bring  hope  and 
thereby  reduce  suffering,  but  only  for  those  who  have 
faith. 
 
Here  we  need  to  remind  ourselves  that  freedom  from 
pain and suffering is not the same as freedom from harm. 
Harm  is  damage  to  our  interests.  We  need  not  be 
conscious of harm for harm to be done to us – we need 
only look at the harms caused by passive smoking, fetal 
alcohol  syndrome,  asbestos,  environmental  lead 
pollution, and so on to see that harm can be done to us 
without us knowing it.  
 
These distinctions between pain, suffering and harm are 
important  and  their  import  goes  far  beyond  mere 
semantics.  
 
Mr Rossiter may choose to die and now, as a result of the 
Supreme Court ruling, neither his nurses nor Brightwater 
will be held legally responsible for his death. And if his 
nurses accede to his wish not to be fed (or meet their 
obligations  to  him  in  this  regard)  they  will  not  have 
harmed him. Death is not necessarily a harm.  
 
It  is  a  measure  of  our  humanity  and  of  our  regard  for 
others how we deal with death. It is also a measure of our 
humanity how we deal with pain, harm and suffering. 
What would it mean to bring a benefit to people like Mr 
Rossiter? We are obliged to ask that question and obliged 
to think very carefully about responses to it no  matter 
how the answers make us feel.  
 
It is not the only moral issue, but a key element in a case 
such as Mr Rossiter’s is finding an answer to the question of 
what it means to care for him. We might all care about Mr 
Rossiter and feel vicarious pain at his suffering, but it is only 
when  we  get  up  close  and  personal  that  we  can  really 
appreciate the very human pain and suffering and the very 
human frustration of people such as Mr Rossiter. Caring for 
him will involve limiting his pain and avoiding harm. But it 
also, crucially, involves limiting his suffering. 
Could  you  look  him  in  the  eye  and  tell  him  that  you, 
personally, were not prepared to give him what he believes 
is good for him? Is it enough to be free of pain? What about 
hope? What hope does someone in Mr Rossiter’s position 
have? A hope is not a mere wish. Mr Rossiter can wish that 
he were no longer a quadriplegic, but, unfortunately (given 
the present state of medicine) he cannot hope to be cured. 
 
Obligation to optimize hope 
We  all  have  obligations  to  other  people,  and  one  of  the 
more fundamental obligations in cases such as Mr Rossiter’s 
is to optimize hope, but not just any hope, and certainly not 
false hope. We  should try to optimize  what University  of 
Kentucky philosopher John Nolt calls satisfiable hopes.
 7 He 
says 
“Hope is an intentional attitude of a person toward a 
state of affairs, which we may call its object-state….To 
hope for a state of affairs is to value it (regard it as 
good and desire it) and think it possible…some hopes 
are satisfiable and some are not. A person’s hope is 
satisfiable  …  if  its  object-state  is  possible  and  her 
assessment  of  its  goodness  and  duration  are  not 
greatly exaggerated or otherwise misconceived
8  
Nolt  notes  that  if  there  is  no  hope  we  are  in  a  state  of 
despair, which is a form of suffering.
9  
 
What the WA Supreme Court has done is uphold the general 
principle that we can refuse a medical procedure. One of 
the effects of this is that Mr Rossiter may choose to die, but 
another signally important effect  of the decision is that he, 
and  others  in  similar  situations,  have  been  given  the 
satisfiable hope of ending their current state of suffering.  
 
In the case of people such as Mr Rossiter where there had 
been no hope of ending suffering, there is now hope. And, 
we  should  note,  the  mere  presence  of  hope  itself  limits 
suffering.  It  may  have  been  a  by-product  of  the  Chief 
Justice’s  ruling  on  the  law  but  through  this  case  the 
community will be able more effectively to act on our  
“individual and collective duty … to prevent or relieve 
despair,  insofar  as  is  reasonably  possible  and 
consistent  with  other  obligations,  by  maintaining  or 
increasing  the  magnitude  of  aggregate  satisfiable 
hope.” 
10 
                                                 
7Nolt, J. (2009). “Hope, Self-Transcendence and the Justification of 
Environmental Ethics,” Inquiry, forthcoming. 
8 Nolt, J. “Hope, ….” 
9 Nolt, J. “Hope, ….” 
10 Nolt, J. “Hope, ….” 
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Some are likely to argue that the court decision puts us on 
a slippery slope to various forms of euthanasia. I  don’t 
wish to argue that point here, but want to close with the 
observation that Mr Rossiter, through the agency of the 
court, has been given hope. He has, at last, the satisfiable 
hope of being able to choose and we, the community, are 
more able to fulfil our obligation to optimize hope and 
thereby  reduce  suffering  for  him,  and  people  in  like 
situations. 
 
A paradoxical result may be that now people such as Mr 
Rossiter have had their right to refuse treatment affirmed, 
they may be less inclined to assert that right because the 
little bit of hope may have eased their suffering enough. 
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